was essentially about basic needs. The focus of earlier reports on 'unemployment' was explicitly rejected (e.g. p. 9) and the problem was defined as that of poverty and inequality. The whole strategy was aimed at achieving minimum income targets which "might be (p.109) . . . for rural households, 120 sh. by 1978 and 180 sh. by 1985, and for urban households 200 sh. and 250 sh. respectively" (in shillings per month at 1971 prices). It was also recognised that these targets were only a "shorthand expression for the real components of a minimum standard of living, namely nutrition, housing, clothing, public utilities, access to amenities, etc." (p.110) . Specific real targets mentioned included the elimination of malnutrition, clean water at a reasonable distance and access to basic health services and to basic education (to be expressed "in such terms as distance from schools and clinics, teacher-pupil ratios, and number of physicians and other health personnel per head of population").
The official response to the ¡LO report's strategy of continued expansion, a wider sharing of the benefits, national integration of the economy and an attack on extreme imbalances and disparities, in the Sessional Paper on Employment (Republic of Kenya, 1973) , was quite favourable. In general it found "the report to be original and innovative, particularly in terms of the broad social and economic framework of analysis within which the problems of unemployment and poverty are examined" (p.ii). However, not all of the report's proposals were endorsed in the sessional paper and the 1974-78 development plan (Republic of Kenya, 1974) , and implementation has been selective. ¡LO recommendations which have been implemented include those for the unification of tariff rates, including intermediate and capital goods (many of them previously duty-free); the abolition of investment allowances in Nairobi and Mombasa; an export subsidy; an increase in the rate of corporation tax on branches of foreign companies and in the rate of withholding tax on dividends paid to nonresidents and on all payments to foreign suppliers of services; a 10 per cent sales tax on all manufactured goods, with essentials such as foodstuffs and agricultural supplies exempted and 'luxury items' taxed at a higher rate; the abolition of graduated personal tax and consumption tax and the introduction of a capital gains tax; the acceptance of site-and-service housing schemes; the abolition of the tax on traditional liquor and of the licensing of taxidrivers; the abolition of fees for the first four years of primary school; a rural works programme (although on a very small scale); and some pilot agricultural projects intended to reach smaller farmers.
ILO recommendations which have not been implemented include those for a progressive land tax, subdivision of land and (as a later possibility) a ceiling on individual land holdings; the ending of the demolition of slum housing and informal-sector business premises, unless for a "positive and overriding development reason", and of "counterproductive harassment" of traders, taxi-drivers, vagrants, etc.; and an incomes policy under which "those who earn less than £200 a year should receive a maximum annual rate of increase of 3 per cent; those in the £200 to £700 group a maximum of less than 3 per cent, and those with incomes over £700
shall have a wage freeze except for increases attributable to promotions or annual increments".
In short, while it is true that many of the ILO report's recommendations have been implemented, implementation has been distinctly patchy. Some of the measures taken are perhaps surprising in the extent to which they confront vested interests (e.g. the capital gains tax, taxation of luxury goods, abolition of investment allowance) but measures implying structural upheaval, such as land ceilings and redistribution, land tax and a freeze on the incomes of the higher paid, have been avoided.
The problem is that the ILO strategy, while perhaps not constituting a totally indivisible package, contains a core of mutually reinforcing recommendations. In particular, the recommendations on the structure of rewards, land policy, technology, protection, the informal sector and education seem to be inextricably linked to each other. For example, the educational reforms recommended would not work in the absence of a substantial change in the structure of rewards. Thus partial implementation is likely to be ineffective and may even in some respects make matters worse. In effect the economy is still at a crossroads as far as strategy is concerned. As the pre-recession 197 1/72 balance-of-payments crisis showed, it is near the end of the easy stage of import substitution. There are now two broad options for further industrialisation.
The first, in the spirit of the ILO report, is that of widening the internal mass market by investment and other policies which benefit those at the bottom of the income scale at the expense of those at the top. The second, in the spirit of the recent World Bank report (World Bank. 1975) , is that of achieving greater efficiency in resource use by "restructuring the pattern" and "reforming the process" of growth, that is by shifting the emphasis towards the more efficient sectors and sub-sectors--from industry to agriculture, from import-substituting to export processing industry, from infrastructure and services to directly productive sectors, etc.--and by improving efficiency within each sector and sub-sector, "getting the prices right" and removing biases in exchange rates, interest rates and product prices. The first option, with its emphasis on redistribution and intervention in the market, is consistent with meeting basic needs; the second, with its emphasis on market criteria of efficiency, is the antithesis of a basic needs strategy. The ILO report recommendations which have been implemented so far are largely those that are common to either strategy, so the options are still open.
1f the basic needs/redistribution option were chosen, it would need to be recognised, perhaps more than did the ILO report, that it represents a rejection of market criteria of efficiency. Polarisation and poverty are only partly due to the state interference emphasized by the report (particularly in the section on the informal sector); in an important sense they arc inherent in the operation of markets, particularly in an economy which is as open to transnational influences as Kenya's is.
For instance, in general the dominance of the formal sector is certainly due to support from the State, particularly the protection it offers from imports and other market entrants. But the need for protection from other market entrants arises from the small size of the market and the less-than-optimum scale of operations that it imposes. As markets grow, economies of scale shift the unit cost advantage to mass-produced formal-sector goods away from the cheap-labour-intensive products of the informal sector. This has already happened in the case of many industries in Kenya (e.g. textiles, footwear).
Moreover, in other consumer-goods industries the formal sector has a market advantage deriving from the way in which it has redefined the needs of consumers, often spending vast amounts on advertising, packaging and marketing for this purpose hut also benefiting from the general spread of acquisitive consumerism in society. The implications for policy of such an examination of the nature of the products of the consumer-goods manufacturers in the formal sector would vary according to the diagnosis. State protection against cömpetition from other market entrants (but not necessarily protection against imports) would be withdrawn in those cases where this was the sole basis of a formal-sector firm's market advantage.
Advertising for the purpose of redefining consumer needs in a way that conflicts with a basic-needs strategy would be banned, and there might be a case for banning a/I advertising of consumer goods except at the point of sale. There might also be a need for government to play an active role n designing and producing alternative goods consistent with the overall strategy.
As well as redesigning the structure of consumer goods production a basic needs strategy would imply restructuring government services. This could be represented as the making of counter bids by government on behalf of the more deprived areas and groups against the demands of the market and of the political system. In the case of health services, for instance, the effective demand of the higher-income groups mainly located in urban areas of the international market and of harambee (self-help) health centres built in the more prosperous rural areas largely determines the nature and pattern of health caret in the absence of strong intervention. Thus a 'quota system' based on need rather than merely on geographical area would be implied.
Within agriculture a basic needs approach to food and nutrition would imply a complete reorientation of strategy, with less emphasis on export cash crops, large farms, progressive smallholders in highpotential areas and more on food for local consumption. This shift, involving research, extension and other public services to agriculture, would be aimed at increasing food production for own consumption, increasing the availability of food on local markets and raising its nutrient quality, as well as at increasing cash incomes. Land redistribution would also be necessary, as a means of ensuring a larger and more equally distributed output and reducing migratory pressure on the towns and marginal areas. lt would need to be combined, however, with continuing measures to counteract the polarising tendencies of Kenyan-style rural development.
The strategy would also imply a need for a further narrowingofpaydifferentialsin the public and private formal sectors. The allocation of 33 per cent of the government's current budget to the Ministry of Education in the 1974-78 plan, the ineffectiveness of attempts at educational reform and the diversion of household expenditure towards schooling fees and expenses are a reflection of the irresistible pull of the dysfunctionally high rewards obtained by the schooled (but not by the skilled). The redesign of the structure of production and of government services, together with other redistributive measures would in any case, imply a drastic remoulding of hierarchical managerial systems and of the nature of the professions, which would complement a narrowing of pay differentials. The managerial cadre of the multi national corporation and the internationally mobile professionals would be among the main losers from such changes and could he expected to oppose them.2 I Redistribution of inconsevoutd nove need ami effective demand ciosu tofether, hut, in the absence of complete equality, a gap would ce ma in 2 See Godfrey (1977) for further discussion of the intplications of a basic needs stratcg\ tor the pritessions.
Finally, meeting basic needs is not costless and a method of provision which at least is not a deduction from capital accumulation is to be preferred. Also the labour-absorptive capacity of the formal sector, while likely to be increased by the structural changes envisaged, would still be limited; capital intensive methods would still be used where they were unequivocally more efficient. Both these considerations imply a need to explore even more carefully the ways in which surplus labour could be put to productive use, either in projects which provide directly for basic needs, such as rural water schemes, or which generate the surplus to finance the costs (particularly the current costs) of basic-needs projects. The current rural works programme is an example of such an approach but its use of central finance and administration is likely to limit theextent of its impact.
Much more in the spirit of a basic needs strategy would be community-based participatory projects. In Kenya's case a question at least worth investigating is the extent to which the harambee movement lends itself to such a purpose. As things stand it must be frankly recognised that large-scale harambee represents a bid for resources from the centre rather than a substitute for such resources. (Leys, 1975: 262 
